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In 2002, the world's computer users generated approximately five exabytes
of data, the informational equivalent of a half a million libraries the size of the
Library of Congress. Ninety-two percent of that new information was stored
magnetically Since then, our appetite for electronic information, and for
hardware that can store greater amounts of it, has grown exponentially.
The law has struggled to keep pace with the proliferation and stockpiling of
electronic data. In particular, this trend has placed severe strains on the existing
framework for discovery, prompting the Civil Rules Advisory Committee of
the U.S. Judicial Conference to recommend amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. As the Advisory Committee has acknowledged, the
traditional paper rules cannot simply be stretched to deal with unprecedented
problems such as the automatic creation of metadata, the retrieval of "deleted"
data, and, most urgently, the sheer volume of electronic information.2
A package of proposed amendments on electronic discovery, or "e-
discovery," has recently been approved by the Judicial Conference and now
awaits consideration by the U.S. Supreme Court. Although the amendment
process appears to be in the final stages, it will be some time before the new
rules go into effect.3 Meanwhile, courts continue to formulate their own e-
1. PETER LYMAN ET AL., SCH. OF INFO. MGMT. & SYS., UNIV. OF CAL. AT BERKELEY, How MUCH
INFORMATION? 2003 (2003), http://www.sims.berkeley.edu:8ooo/research/projects/how-
much-info-20o3/printable-report.pdf.
2. See REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE 40 (amended July 25, 2005), reprinted
in COMM. ON THE RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S., SUMMARY OF COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: AGENDA E-18 app.
C (Sept. 2005) [hereinafter PROPOSED AMENDMENTS].
3. If the Court promulgates the proposed amendments by May i, 2006, the new rules will take
effect on December 1, 2006, unless Congress enacts legislation to reject, modify, or defer the
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discovery rules. One recent case, Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC,4 has
intensified corporations' anxiety about their e-discovery obligations. In this
employment discrimination case, the district court treated data stored on
magnetic backup tapes as broadly discoverable, eventually instructing the jury
that it could infer bad faith on the part of the corporation for its e-discovery
failures.'
While Zubulake and recent commentary on e-discovery have emphasized
balancing the interests of the litigants, this Comment shifts the focus to the
collateral effects that e-discovery may have on everyday employment relations.
Specifically, this Comment contends that the e-discovery framework offered by
Zubulake increases incentives for employers to implement intrusive forms of
electronic surveillance. While the Judicial Conference's proposed rules may
reduce these incentives indirectly by easing the discovery burdens on
employers, courts applying the new rules can and should engage the issue of
employee privacy directly. This Comment suggests how courts can shape e-
discovery procedures to discourage the abuse of surveillance technologies and
protect privacy in the workplace.
I. THE ZUBULAKE STANDARD
In Zubulake, a former employee sued UBS Warburg for gender
discrimination and illegal retaliation. During the discovery phase, the plaintiff
requested "[a]ll documents concerning any communication by or between UBS
employees concerning Plaintiff," including internal e-mails stored on the firm's
active and archived media.6 The court took the discoverability of the disaster
recovery tapes as given,7 but ordered a sample restoration of five tapes to assess
the cost of producing all the relevant data. It was only later, when ruling on
UBS's cost-shifting motion, that the court gave special consideration to the
rules. See U.S. Courts, Federal Rulemaking, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/#judiciao9oS
(last visited Oct. 2, 2005); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2000).
4. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake 1), 217 F.RD. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2oo3); Zubulake v.
UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 22o F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg
LLC (Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
S. Zubulake V, 229 F.RtD. at 436-37.
6. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 312.
7. Id. at 317 ("Thus, '[e]lectronic documents are no less subject to disclosure than paper
records.' This is true not only of electronic documents that are currently in use, but also of
documents that may have been deleted and now reside only on backup disks." (quoting
Rowe Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421,428 (S.D.N.Y. 2002))).
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inaccessible nature of the requested information.! As part of a multifactor cost-
shifting test, the court analyzed whether the plaintiffs request for inaccessible
data was specifically tailored to discover relevant information and whether the
information was available from more accessible sources.9 Evaluating sixty-
eight e-mails from the sample production that the plaintiff had pinpointed as
"highly relevant to the issues," the court concluded that the sample restoration
sufficiently "demonstrated that Zubulake's discovery request was narrowly
tailored,"1" while admitting that it was "speculative" that the backup tapes
contained the smoking-gun email that Zubulake sought.11 The court eventually
ordered UBS to restore and produce the remaining tapes and to bear seventy-
five percent of the production costs."
In subsequent rulings in the case, the court turned its attention to whether
UBS had committed spoliation-the destruction of discoverable evidence.
Restoration of the backup tapes revealed that key players had deleted relevant
e-mails from their computers after the lawsuit was filed. Furthermore, UBS
had recycled some tapes in violation of its retention policy, and UBS's counsel
had failed to inform two employees to turn over responsive e-mails stored in
their active files. 3 Although the corporation's failures were arguably only
negligent, 4 the court found that the employees' deletions of e-mails had been
willful and granted the plaintiff s motion for an adverse inference instruction to
8. Zubulake 1, 217 F.R.D. at 324 ("A court should consider cost-shifting only when electronic
data is relatively inaccessible, such as in backup tapes."). Under Zubulake, data is
inaccessible if some process, such as restoration or reconstruction, is necessary to render the
information humanly intelligible. Id. at 320.
9. These are the two most important factors in Zubulake's seven-part cost-shifting test. See
Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 284. The other factors are:
the total cost of production, compared to the amount in controversy; the total
cost of production, compared to the resources available to each party; the relative
ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do so; the importance of
the issues at stake in the litigation; and the relative benefits to the parties of
obtaining the information.
Id.
io. Id. at 285-87 (internal quotation marks omitted).
11. Id. at 286-87.
12. Id. at 291.
13. Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 426-30.
14. Zubulake IV, 22o F.R.D. at 220-21.
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the jury."5 Ultimately, the jury awarded the plaintiff $9.1 million in
compensatory damages and $20.1 million in punitive damages. 6
II. ZUBULAKE AND EMPLOYEE PRIVACY
Zubulake has had an impact far beyond the Southern District of New York,
influencing courts in other jurisdictions 7 and alarming corporations (and their
counsel) across the country.s Zubulake poignantly demonstrates that a court
can order the production of old disaster recovery tapes even if no one knows
exactly what they contain. Given the broad relevance standard of the Federal
Rules, the scope of discoverable evidence may encompass hundreds, even
thousands, of difficult-to-restore tapes.1 9 Moreover, under Zubulake, a
corporation may face stiff sanctions if it inadvertently recycles a tape that a
court later decides should have been preserved, or if employees delete relevant
e-mails despite corporate counsel's reasonable care to enforce a litigation-
hold.2" Multiply these costs by the number of lawsuits a corporation faces every
year, and e-discovery could wind up dictating the outcome in many instances,
as companies choose to settle rather than face extensive e-discovery costs.2
is. Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 436.
16. See Eduardo Porter, UBS Ordered To Pay $29 Million in Sex Bias Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7,
2005, at C4.
17. See, e.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. io8 (N.D. Il1. 2004); OpenTV v.
Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
18. See Wendy Davis, The Zubulake Road Show: Lawyers Are Traveling to Conferences, Companies
To Explain E-Discovery Opinions, 91 A.B.A. J. 22 (2005) ("[Zubulake] has lawyers across the
country hitting the road to lecture corporations, speak on panels and reassure skittish
clients."); David W. Garland & William R. Horwitz, Avoiding Sanctions in Electronic
Discovery, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Oct. 2004, at 18.
ig. The process of restoring and searching through tapes, removing duplicates, and conducting
privilege review can be extremely expensive. See McPeek v. Ashcroft, 212 F.R.D. 33, 35
(D.D.C. 2003) ("The frustration of electronic discovery as it relates to backup tapes is that
backup tapes collect information indiscriminately, regardless of topic. One, therefore,
cannot reasonably predict that information is likely to be on a particular tape."); Medtronic
Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 557-58 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (noting that it
could cost "several million" dollars for Medtronic to search through 996 backup tapes and
an additional $16.S to $70 million to conduct privilege review).
20. See Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 435; see also Thomas Y. Allman, Ruling Offers Lessons for
Counsel on Electronic Discovery Abuse 2 (Wash. Legal Found., Legal Backgrounder Vol. 19,
No. 34, 2004) http://www.wlf.org/upload/1o15o4LBAlman.pdf (arguing that "[t]here is no
room for error, carelessness or preoccupation with other responsibilities in this regard").
21. See Conference on Electronic Discovery: Panel Four: Rule 37 and/or a New Rule 34.1: Safe
Harbors for E-Document Preservation and Sanctions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 77 (2004)
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in short, by combining a low bar for the discoverability of inaccessible data
with the possibility of severe sanctions for negligent destruction, the Zubulake
framework places a heavy burden on employers with large information
systems. Systematic electronic surveillance thus becomes an attractive option,
because it enables employers to (1) keep employees from using company
networks for personal reasons, thereby reducing the amount of data captured
on backup tapes; (2) detect improper employee behavior before a lawsuit is
lodged against the company; and (3) prevent key players from erasing evidence
from their computers once litigation is anticipated. With Zubulake on the
books, and increasingly sophisticated surveillance technologies flooding the
market, employee privacy is in serious jeopardy.'
But why should we care about employee privacy? Private-sector employees
have neither a federal constitutional right nor a statutory right to privacy in the
workplace. Under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act2" and the law of
most states, a private employer may freely monitor employees' electronic
activities when they are using firm property, so long as the employer has some
plausible business justification, such as enhancing worker productivity. 4
The fact remains, however, that many employees continue to hold onto a
subjective expectation of privacy, at least with regard to extreme intrusions.
Evidence of this subjective expectation can be found in studies showing that
workers who are aware of constant surveillance exhibit higher levels of anxiety
and fatigue.2" These studies also indicate that surveillance may lower worker
productivity, spawning widespread dissatisfaction and increasing the
corporation's liability exposure. For example, if management intercepts or
retrieves sexually harassing e-mails but fails to take steps to ameliorate the
situation, the corporation could be held liable for tolerating a hostile work
(quoting Laura Lewis Bird, Partner, Alston & Bird LLP, stating that a corporation may need
to budget $500,000 for electronic retention and retrieval for a case worth that dollar
amount).
22. Am. MGMT. ASS'N, 2001 AMA SURVEY: WORKPLACE MONITORING & SURVEILLANCE:
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 1 (2001), http://www.amanet.org/research/pdfs/
ems_short200l.pdf (reporting that, as of 2001, 36.1% of firms monitor computer files, and
46.5% monitor e-mails).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 2511-2520, 2701-2707 (2000).
24. See, e.g., Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (applying Pennsylvania
law); McLaren v. Microsoft Corp., No. o5-9 7-oo824-CV, 1999 WL 339015 (Tex. App. May
28, 1999).
25. See, e.g., NAT'L WORKRIGHTS INST., PRIVACY UNDER SIEGE: ELECTRONIC MONITORING IN
THE WORKPLACE 5 (2004), http://www.workrights.org/issue-electronic/NWI-EM-
Report.pdf.
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environment.26 Thus, while corporations may have previously believed that
spot checks or searches based on individual suspicion were sufficient to meet
legal and business requirements and that the higher expenses and lower
employee morale associated with continuous surveillance outweighed any
additional benefits,27 Zubulake has altered this balance.
III. THE NEW E-DISCOVERY RULES
The adoption of the new e-discovery rules provides an opportunity to
recalibrate the balance between employers' interests in reducing their e-
discovery burdens and employees' interests in protecting against invasive
forms of surveillance. The proposed rules offer two features designed to
alleviate e-discovery burdens: (1) a two-tier structure of discoverability, with
different procedures for accessible and inaccessible electronic data; and (2) a
safe harbor for the loss of electronic evidence. I will discuss each of these
features in turn.
The two-tier structure appears in proposed Rule 26, which requires parties
to produce all reasonably accessible electronic data without further prompting,
but relieves them from producing information from sources that the party
identifies as "not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. ' 2 8s If a
party's designation of inaccessibility is challenged, it must persuade the court
that the extreme burden or cost of production makes the withheld data "not
reasonably accessible." If that showing is made, the burden shifts to the
requesting party to show that "good cause" nonetheless warrants discovery. 9
Proposed Rule 26 incorporates the consideration of costs and the balancing
of burdens, which Zubulake confined to the cost-shifting analysis, into the
threshold inquiry of whether information should be discoverable at all. Thus,
in contrast to the Zubulake framework -which treats all relevant, nonprivileged
data as uniformly discoverable -the proposed model removes electronic data
26. See Peter J. Bezek et al., Employer Monitoring of Employee Internet Use and E-Mail: Nightmare
or Necessity?, 2-11 Mealey's Cyber Tech Litig. Rep. 27 (2001) (discussing the costs of
electronic monitoring, including increased risk of liability, low employee morale, and direct
expenses).
27. See Christopher Pearson Fazekas, 1984 Is Still Fiction: Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace
and U.S. Privacy Law, 2004 DuKE L. & TECH. REV. 15, 22-28, http://www.law.duke.edu/
journals/dltr/articles/PDF/2oo4DLTRool5.pdf (arguing that employers are unlikely to
abuse their right to monitor employees because it would dampen employee morale).
28. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, Rule 26(b)(2) (B).
29. Id.
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from the scope of discoverability if the court finds that production would be
overly burdensome and no good cause exists to override that determination.
Whether the new model will actually cut e-discovery costs for companies,
however, depends on how strictly or liberally courts decide to interpret the
good cause requirement. Proposed Rule 26 directs courts to consider the
general proportionality limitations contained in current Rule 26(b)(2)(i)-(iii)
in determining whether the requesting party has established good cause.30
Because these factors already govern the discovery of inaccessible evidence (as
they do all types of evidence), a straight reapplication of these standards under
the guise of a good cause analysis would frustrate the motivating purpose
behind the amendments to alleviate the burdens posed by e-discovery. If the
line drawn in the proposed rules between accessible and inaccessible data is to
be a meaningful one, the limitations in Rule 26(b) must have sharper bite in
the context of inaccessible data." Courts should in all cases require the party
seeking the discovery of inaccessible data to establish a high likelihood that the
requested evidence does not exist in more accessible locations. In addition, the
requesting party should be required to show that the inaccessible data likely
contains evidence relevant to a claim or defense, as opposed to evidence
relating to the general subject matter of the litigation.3 2 In determining
whether a request is framed with sufficient specificity, courts should carefully
analyze the characteristics of the storage media and information system at
issue. A seemingly narrowly worded request-for example, one that seeks all e-
mails in a one-year span that mention the plaintiffs name -should be rejected
if the respondent cannot locate such e-mails without first having to restore its
entire inventory of backup tapes. Strengthened in this way, the good cause
requirement would actually ease e-discovery burdens.
If the two-tier model reduces compliance costs for employers, it could
indirectly benefit employee privacy by making aggressive methods of electronic
30. The committee note to proposed Rule 26 adopts Zubulake's seven-part structure, see supra
note 9, for the good cause analysis, but replaces the factors dealing with amount-in-
controversy and relative ability to control costs with factors that expand upon the relevance
of the inaccessible data and the existence of relevant data in more accessible sources.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, Rule 26(b)(2)(B) committee note.
31. Because proposed Rule 26 makes the consideration of costs a factor in defining the scope of
discoverability, it may completely displace the need for apportioning production costs.
Consequently, if Rule 26 (b)(2) limitations are not applied more stringently in the context of
inaccessible data, corporations may wind up paying more for e-discovery under the
proposed model than under the existing Zubulake framework.
32. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party.... For good cause, the court
may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.").
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surveillance less cost-effective and desirable. However, instead of simply
hoping that the proposed Rule 26 will prompt employers to voluntarily protect
employee privacy, courts could directly promote employee privacy by
considering invasion of privacy as an additional cost that weighs against the
expected benefit of e-discovery. 3 To illustrate, a request for all relevant e-mails
written by a minor player in the case should be considered overly burdensome
if it would require the company to read through all of the employee's personal
e-mails to ascertain which, if any, are relevant to the suit.
Moreover, courts should acknowledge employee privacy only to the extent
that the employer has done so itself. If the corporation has utilized extensive
surveillance technology to monitor employees, then it should be precluded
from offering its employees' nonexistent privacy as a reason for limiting its
discovery obligations - thereby providing an incentive for the company to
protect employee privacy. As one court has remarked: "To permit a corporation
• ..to reap the business benefits of such technology and simultaneously use
that technology as a shield in litigation would lead to incongruous and unfair
results."34
The second innovation introduced by the proposed amendments is a safe
harbor for the loss of electronic data. Proposed Rule 37 shields a party from
sanctions if it has lost discoverable data due to the "routine, good-faith
operation" of its electronic information system.35 AS the committee note
explains, the concept of a routine operation includes "the alteration and
overwriting of information, often without the operator's specific direction or
awareness, a feature with no direct counterpart in hard-copy documents. ''36 In
other words, proposed Rule 37 would protect a corporation from sanctions for
inadvertently permitting a backup tape to be automatically overwritten, but not
for failing to prevent employees from deleting relevant e-mails. Thus, even
with this safe harbor in place, many companies may still decide that electronic
surveillance is necessary to thwart willful spoliation by employees.
To avoid this result, courts could interpret proposed Rule 37 to promote
employee privacy by varying the application of the safe harbor according to the
33. See Michael Marron, Comment, Discoverability of "Deleted" E-Mail: Time for a Closer
Examination, 25 SEArLE U. L. REv. 895, 897 (2002) (arguing that "[p]ublic policy concerns
such as communication efficiency, individual privacy, and free speech should outweigh the
rights of a litigant to access deleted e-mail correspondence without some showing of
particular relevance or need").
34. Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., No. 97-2307, 1999 WL 462015, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 16,
1999).
35. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, Rule 37(f).
36. See id., Rule 37 (f) committee note.
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level of employee surveillance a company maintains. For example, courts could
impose harsher spoliation sanctions on companies that have instituted
continuous or blanket forms of electronic surveillance, as opposed to limited
surveillance confined to key players after the preservation duty has attached.
Such a policy is certainly reasonable: A corporation that has adopted extensive
surveillance measures has a greater technological capacity to prevent employees
from deleting relevant evidence, and should therefore be held to a higher
standard of preservation. Courts could also broaden the scope of discoverable
backup tapes if evidence shows that employees have deleted relevant e-mails,
on the theory that there is good cause to believe that a corporation that closely
monitors its employees probably knew about and condoned the spoliation.1
7 If
the corresponding backup data has been lost in a routine operation, courts
could consider the extent of a corporation's surveillance as evidence tending to
support a finding of bad faith, which would render the safe harbor of Rule
37 (f) inapplicable.
CONCLUSION
The two-tier model of electronic discovery, with its good cause
requirement and safe harbor, could have the unintended effect of benefiting
employee privacy if it alleviates the pressure on companies to turn to data-
mining and tracking programs as ways of managing e-discovery. However,
there is ample room in the new e-discovery framework to more fully protect
employee privacy, and this Comment has suggested some practical ways in
which the new rules, and the courts that will apply them, can actively
discourage companies from adopting intrusive forms of surveillance. While
technology advances with frightening speed, our notions of privacy appear to
be stuck in the nineteenth century. The time has come to reexamine the value
of privacy and update it to fit the world we live in.
ELAINE KI JIN KIM
37. See id., Rule 26(b)(2) committee note (stating that "the failure to produce relevant
information that seems likely to have existed but is no longer available on more easily
accessed sources" is an appropriate consideration for construing good cause).
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